Leg 1 — Over-collateralizationレッグ1 — 過剰担保 Flare
OVER_COLLATERALIZEDOVER_COLLATERALIZED(過剰担保)
Read from the FAssets protocol's own AgentStatus (NORMAL / CCB / LIQUIDATION). 6 agents, 0 flagged.FAssetsプロトコル自身のAgentStatus(NORMAL / CCB / LIQUIDATION)から読み取り。エージェント 6 件、フラグ 0 件。
Leg 2 — XRPL 1:1 backingレッグ2 — XRPL 1:1 裏付け XRPL
PROVENPROVEN(証明済み)
Real XRP re-derived from raw XRPL (agents + Core Vault, incl. on-ledger escrow). No indexer, no oracle.生のXRPLデータから再導出した実XRP(エージェント + コアボールト、オンレジャー・エスクロー含む)。インデクサーもオラクルも不使用。
Mark-to-market — independent, via Flare FTSOv2 Flare oracle時価評価 — 独立、Flare FTSOv2経由 Flareオラクル
Each agent's collateral ratio re-derived from raw amounts × Flare's own FTSOv2 oracle — the protocol's self-reported CR, independently CHECKED. Agent collateral covers the minted obligation by 594%; 0 agent(s) diverged >20% from the reported CR.各エージェントの担保比率を、生の数量 × FlareのFTSOv2オラクルから再導出 — プロトコル自己申告のCRを独立に検証。エージェント担保は発行債務の594%をカバー。0件が報告CRから20%超乖離。
| Collateral value (USD, FTSOv2)担保評価額(USD, FTSOv2) | $11,057,778.70 |
| Minted obligation (USD)発行債務(USD) | $1,860,428.35 |
| Coverageカバー率 | 594.4% |
Prices (FTSOv2):価格(FTSOv2): XRP $0.9995 · FLR $0.0060 · USDT $0.9989
What this does and does not mean本証明が意味すること・しないこと
Provable with no trust beyond the ledgers:レジャー以外の信頼を要さず証明可能: XRPL 1:1 backing (agent + Core-Vault balances incl. on-ledger escrow, re-derived from raw XRPL, no indexer/oracle) and agent over-collateralization VERIFIED against the system-required floor (read from Flare mainnet); fail-closed to CANNOT_VERIFY if the floor cannot be read.XRPL 1:1 backing (agent + Core-Vault balances incl. on-ledger escrow, re-derived from raw XRPL, no indexer/oracle) and agent over-collateralization VERIFIED against the system-required floor (read from Flare mainnet); fail-closed to CANNOT_VERIFY if the floor cannot be read.
Conditional on named trust:指定された信頼を前提とする: FDC attestation set (mint proofs); and the named on-chain custodian (rMLNvZR9dascY5jtCfCv3whAp8HdUSZAQ) that the Core-Vault escrows pay to and whose ENTIRE balance is attributed to FXRP backing — verified on-ledger, its honesty and full-attribution trusted.FDC attestation set (mint proofs); and the named on-chain custodian (rMLNvZR9dascY5jtCfCv3whAp8HdUSZAQ) that the Core-Vault escrows pay to and whose ENTIRE balance is attributed to FXRP backing — verified on-ledger, its honesty and full-attribution trusted.
Not claimed:主張しないこと: That FXRP is safe from every economic risk; this is a solvency snapshot (backing net of redeeming >= supply AND every exposed agent verifiably over its floor), not an audit of the FAssets contracts or FDC.That FXRP is safe from every economic risk; this is a solvency snapshot (backing net of redeeming >= supply AND every exposed agent verifiably over its floor), not an audit of the FAssets contracts or FDC.
Caveats (12)留意事項(12)
- POINT-IN-TIME: verdict is pinned to the block/ledger above and decays the next ledger; re-run for a current view.時点固定:判定は上記のブロック/レジャーに固定され、次のレジャーで陳腐化する。現在の状況は再実行のこと。
- IN-FLIGHT: redeeming (0 UBA) is NETTED OUT of the solvency comparison — that XRP is earmarked to leave to redeemers, so it does not back the remaining FXRP (netting it is the conservative direction). Reserved (0 UBA, mid-mint collateral) is not netted: no FXRP is minted against it yet, so it is backing-neutral.IN-FLIGHT: redeeming (0 UBA) is NETTED OUT of the solvency comparison — that XRP is earmarked to leave to redeemers, so it does not back the remaining FXRP (netting it is the conservative direction). Reserved (0 UBA, mid-mint collateral) is not netted: no FXRP is minted against it yet, so it is backing-neutral.
- CORE-VAULT ESCROW: 140000000000000 UBA of Core-Vault backing is in XRPL Escrows — CONDITION-GATED (crypto-condition + CancelAfter, not a simple time-lock) and verified to pay ONLY the on-chain custodian rMLNvZR9dascY5jtCfCv3whAp8HdUSZAQ. Escrows paying elsewhere (0 UBA) are EXCLUDED from backing. The custodian's own balance is included, so a FINISHED escrow stays counted. The custodian is a named, trusted holder — this binds the claim to its on-chain identity, it does not make custody trustless.コアボールト・エスクロー:コアボールト裏付けのうち 140000000000000 UBA はXRPLエスクロー内 — 条件付き(crypto-condition + CancelAfter、単純なタイムロックではない)で、オンチェーン・カストディアン rMLNvZR9dascY5jtCfCv3whAp8HdUSZAQ のみへの支払いを検証済み。他所宛てのエスクロー(0 UBA)は裏付けから除外。カストディアン自身の残高は含めるため、完了したエスクローも計上され続ける。カストディアンは指定された信頼される保持者であり、これは主張をそのオンチェーン識別子に結び付けるが、カストディを無信頼にするものではない。
- AGENT ESCROWS: agent underlying escrows are counted as backing ONLY if they return to the agent's own address; any agent escrow paying elsewhere is EXCLUDED (0 UBA this run) since it would leave the system on finish (symmetric with the Core-Vault custodian binding).AGENT ESCROWS: agent underlying escrows are counted as backing ONLY if they return to the agent's own address; any agent escrow paying elsewhere is EXCLUDED (0 UBA this run) since it would leave the system on finish (symmetric with the Core-Vault custodian binding).
- CUSTODIAN ATTRIBUTION: the custodian's ENTIRE liquid balance is attributed to FXRP backing; if the custodian ever holds XRP unrelated to FXRP finished-escrow proceeds this over-counts. Its holding is verified on-ledger; the full-attribution is a trusted assumption.CUSTODIAN ATTRIBUTION: the custodian's ENTIRE liquid balance is attributed to FXRP backing; if the custodian ever holds XRP unrelated to FXRP finished-escrow proceeds this over-counts. Its holding is verified on-ledger; the full-attribution is a trusted assumption.
- RESERVES INCLUDED: liquid figures use the raw XRPL account Balance, which includes each account's (unspendable) base + owner reserve — a small bounded over-count of spendable backing (~1 XRP base + ~0.2 XRP per owned object, per account).RESERVES INCLUDED: liquid figures use the raw XRPL account Balance, which includes each account's (unspendable) base + owner reserve — a small bounded over-count of spendable backing (~1 XRP base + ~0.2 XRP per owned object, per account).
- FDC (mint side): FAssets trusts Flare's FDC attestations for XRPL->Flare mint proofs. This tool now CHECKS the FDC attestation layer's liveness on-chain via the Relay — latest finalized FDC (protocol 200) Merkle root at round 1427004, 10/10 recent rounds finalized (LIVE/fresh). It reads the same root FdcVerification checks against; it does NOT verify each individual mint proof (that needs the DA-layer proof, out of scope), and LEG 2 re-derives XRPL balances directly regardless.FDC (mint side): FAssets trusts Flare's FDC attestations for XRPL->Flare mint proofs. This tool now CHECKS the FDC attestation layer's liveness on-chain via the Relay — latest finalized FDC (protocol 200) Merkle root at round 1427004, 10/10 recent rounds finalized (LIVE/fresh). It reads the same root FdcVerification checks against; it does NOT verify each individual mint proof (that needs the DA-layer proof, out of scope), and LEG 2 re-derives XRPL balances directly regardless.
- CR FLOOR: LEG 1 flags an agent below the system-required floor (getCollateralTypes minCollateralRatioBIPS: pool 150% / vault 120%) OR whose AgentStatus is non-NORMAL — catching a below-floor agent liquidation has NOT yet been triggered against (FAssets liquidation is permissionless/trigger-driven, so status alone is insufficient).CR FLOOR: LEG 1 flags an agent below the system-required floor (getCollateralTypes minCollateralRatioBIPS: pool 150% / vault 120%) OR whose AgentStatus is non-NORMAL — catching a below-floor agent liquidation has NOT yet been triggered against (FAssets liquidation is permissionless/trigger-driven, so status alone is insufficient).
- MARK-TO-MARKET (LEG 1.5): each agent's collateral ratio is INDEPENDENTLY re-derived from raw collateral amounts (totalVaultCollateralWei/totalPoolCollateralNATWei) valued in USD via Flare's own FTSOv2 oracle (0x7BDE3Df0624114eDB3A67dFe6753e62f4e7c1d20), vs the minted-XRP obligation — turning the protocol's SELF-REPORTED CR into a CHECKED one. Agent collateral (USD) covers the minted obligation by 594.4%. 0 agent(s) diverged >20% from the reported CR. This is an ADDITIVE cross-check; it does not gate the two-leg verdict.MARK-TO-MARKET (LEG 1.5): each agent's collateral ratio is INDEPENDENTLY re-derived from raw collateral amounts (totalVaultCollateralWei/totalPoolCollateralNATWei) valued in USD via Flare's own FTSOv2 oracle (0x7BDE3Df0624114eDB3A67dFe6753e62f4e7c1d20), vs the minted-XRP obligation — turning the protocol's SELF-REPORTED CR into a CHECKED one. Agent collateral (USD) covers the minted obligation by 594.4%. 0 agent(s) diverged >20% from the reported CR. This is an ADDITIVE cross-check; it does not gate the two-leg verdict.
- COLLATERAL SCOPE: LEG-1 flags/unverifiable are scoped to agents with mintedUBA>0 (FXRP-holder exposure); a distressed agent with zero minted FXRP owes redeemers, not holders, and is surfaced per-agent but not counted into the system verdict.COLLATERAL SCOPE: LEG-1 flags/unverifiable are scoped to agents with mintedUBA>0 (FXRP-holder exposure); a distressed agent with zero minted FXRP owes redeemers, not holders, and is surfaced per-agent but not counted into the system verdict.
- CROSS-CHAIN SKEW: supply is read at the Flare block and backing at the XRPL ledger above — near-simultaneous but not identical instants; a mint/redeem completing between them is not netted (bounded by in-window volume).CROSS-CHAIN SKEW: supply is read at the Flare block and backing at the XRPL ledger above — near-simultaneous but not identical instants; a mint/redeem completing between them is not netted (bounded by in-window volume).
- AGENT SET: enumerated via getAllAgents paginated by end-index (start,start+1000); complete for the current 6 agents and beyond.AGENT SET: enumerated via getAllAgents paginated by end-index (start,start+1000); complete for the current 6 agents and beyond.